We propose a measure of the extent to which a financial institution is connected to the real economy. The Share of Core Assets (SCA) is a measure of composition of the assets -namely, the share of the credit to the non-financial sectors (households, firms, and governments) over the total credit market instruments. We construct the SCA for more than 3,700 U.S. bank holding companies. An asset weighted average of the SCA declines by 20 percentage points in the period 1995:1 to 2012:4 (from 76% to 56%); it then increases by about 10 percentage points in the period 2013:1 to 2016:4. We explore the extent to which risk-sharing among banks and efficiency of capital allocation can explain the cross-sectional dispersion of our measure, and we find that these two motives account for between 8% and 24% of the cross-sectional variation of the SCA, depending on the sample used.
Introduction
In several countries, the financial sector underwent a radical transformation during the last decades. The emergence of new actors within the financial sector, collectively known as the "shadow banking system", coupled with a wave of financial innovations, have substantially increased the complexity and transformed the nature of the financial intermediation process. One of the results of the crisis was the emergence of a debate on the role that a financial sector should play in a society (see for instance Zingales (2015) and references therein).
A prominent argument advocated by policymakers and commentators is that the financial sector should "serve the real economy", as witnessed by the quote reported above. This vision has already started shaping policy decisions -for instance, the introduction of the Volcker Rule in the US 3 , or the use of Targeted Long Term Financing Operations by the European Central Bank. 4 Essentially, a financial sector's primary role is to channel the pool of savings in an economy towards the most productive investments. However, to date there is no metric that allows us to measure the extent to which a financial sector performs such a role, and effectively "serves" the real economy. As a first step in dealing with this very important issue, we introduce in this paper a measure of the extent to which a financial institution is connected 3 The prohibition for commercial banks to engage in certain proprietary trading activities. 4 A refinancing scheme for banks based on the amount of lending extended to the real economy.
to the real economy: the Share of Core Assets (SCA). This is a simple measure of the composition of the assets -namely, the share of credit to non-financial sectors (households, firms, and governments) in the total value of credit market instruments held by a financial institution. We compute the SCA for over 3,700 U.S. bank holding companies, and we study some of its potential determinants and implications. We proceed in three steps.
First, we illustrate our measure. We use balance sheet information for U.S. bank holding companies. Obviously, this only captures a part of the U.S. financial system. However, bank holding companies are the actors for which the best data are available. In this sense, we choose accuracy over coverage. An asset-weighted average of the SCA declines by 20
percentage points between the first quarter of 1995 and the fourth quarter of 2012 (from 76% to 56%), after which point it increases by about 10 percentage points in the period between 2013:1 and 2016:4. Contrastingly, a simple average of the measure stays roughly constant over the period. While the increase in the disconnectedness between the financial sector and the real economy is thus mostly explained by the behaviour of larger banks, we provide examples of how some large banks in our sample are highly connected to the real economy, while other smaller banks are highly disconnected.
Second, we investigate the extent to which risk-sharing and efficiency in capital allocation motives explain the observed dispersion of the SCA across banks. We introduce a simple model where a greater disconnectedness between a bank and the real economy is only due either to a risk-sharing motive or to greater efficiency in the allocation of capital. We model a financial intermediary that can invest in either its core assets (lending to households and firms) or non-core assets (buying claims from other banks). In the presence of a meanvariance objective function, both the expected returns of different assets and the correlation structure of the returns play a key role. In particular, the higher the correlation between the returns on the core assets and the aggregate state of the economy, the lower the incentive would be to diversify the portfolio, and hence, the lower the expected "disconnectedness"
between the bank and the real economy. On the other hand, the higher the expected return on the core assets, the larger should be the connectedness between the bank and the real economy, due to an efficiency in capital allocation motive.
This conceptual framework leads to a two-stage empirical analysis. In the first stage, we run Fama-McBeth (1973) style time series regressions for each bank, where we tease out bank-specific α, representing the average return on the banks assets, and bank-specific β, capturing the correlation of the bank's return with aggregate measures of return (we use the S&P 500, a house price index and the interest rate on a 1-year US government bond).
In the second stage, we regress the average SCA on the αs and the βs obtained from the first stage and some other controls. We find that the αs and the βs display positive and statistically significant coefficients in the regressions. However, we find that the role of these two motives as determinants of the SCA is quite limited, explaining between 8% and 24% of the cross-sectional variation. We then investigate whether netting out pure intermediation activities (possibly driven by a different logic than capital allocation efficiency and risk sharing) can help to improve our results by constructing a "Net" SCA. We do not find significant improvements in the predictive power of the αs and the βs. Finally, we investigate whether a broader definition of profitability can be a candidate to help explaining the crosssectional dispersion of the SCA. This could be due to the presence of non-interest, incomegenerating factors (such as fees) that characterize investments in non-core assets, but are absent from investments in core-assets. We expand our conceptual framework incorporating such potential elements, and investigate the relation between SCA with profitability, now measured as the overall return on equity (ROE). Surprisingly, however, we find a significant positive correlation between the ROE and the SCA, conditional on leverage and size.
Third, we perform a more "structural" exercise, by computing a bank-level, model-based optimal shares of core assets (OSCA γ ), which depend on the parameter of risk aversion γ.
For reasonable values of the parameter γ, almost the entire distribution of OSCA γ collapses to a mass point at one. While this is a clearly demanding exercise, it seems to indicate that the banks in our sample experienced a suboptimal connectedness to the real economy over the period we consider.
This paper is linked to several strands of the literature. First, this paper is related to the analysis of the relation between financial firms and the real economy. Yilmaz (2012, 2014) Lastly, the paper is linked to the vast literature on the determinants of profitability of banks. Bourke (1989) for an early study of the importance of concentration on banking profitability, Molyneux and Thornton (1992) for a similar more recent study on European banks and Goddard et al (2004) for a joint study of banking profitability and growth.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section contains the description of our measure, whose determinants are studied in Section 3. Section 4 propose our structural exercises deriving the optimal shares of core assets. Section 5 concludes.
5 See also the discussion of non-core liabilities contained in Adrian and Shin (2011a) 6 See also the survey on Financial Intermediation by Gordon and Winton (2003).
The Share of Core Assets
We propose a measure of the composition of the assets as a proxy for the extent to which a financial institution is connected to the real economy. The Share of Core Assets (SCA)
is the share of credit market instruments whose direct counterpart is in the non-financial sectors (households, firms, governments):
where CREDIT REAL it is the sum of loans to the non-financial sectors and the holdings of treasuries, while CREDIT it is the sum of total loans and securities (available for sales, held-to-maturity, and trading securities Using the data for the U.S. bank holding companies, we construct the measure contained in equation (1) for over 3,700 banks for the period between 1995:1 and 2016:4. Table 1 contains some basics descriptive statistics. In our sample, the average SCA is 0.75, with a standard deviation of 0.14. The banks we consider have average assets worth 9.32 billions dollars, but they are characterized by a huge heterogeneity in size (assets range from 20 millions to 2.5 trillion dollars). Mean leverage is 12.24 and the average yearly return on equity (ROE) is about 8%. In order to confirm the intuition that larger banks are indeed the drivers of the result obtained in Figure ( 1), we present in Figure ( 2) the evolution of the SCA by bank size. We divide banks into three groups, corresponding roughly to the top 3% of the average assets distribution, the bottom 90%, and a middle group, including banks between the 90 th and the 97 th percentile of the average asset size distribution. In Figure ( 3), we also report the evolution of the dispersion of our SCA across size groups.
The dispersion of our measure is larger for medium banks than for small banks. Moreover, the dispersion of the measure for large banks increases significantly from 2004 onwards. 10 Surprisingly, the dynamics of the SCA for Security Bancorp Tennessee is more similar to that of J.P. Morgan than to the one of Iowa First. Thus, we conclude that in our sample there are large banks disconnected from the real economy and large banks relatively more connected, as well as small banks connected to the real economy and small banks relatively less connected.
From a theoretical perspective, the correlation between size and connectedness is ambiguous. On the one hand, as small banks tend to be more specialized (either geographically 8 The two jumps in the series correspond to the mergers between J.P. Morgan and Chase in early 2000, and between J.P. Morgan Chase and Bank One in mid 2004.
9 Wells Fargo average assets over the period are above 600 billions dollars. 10 The average assets for Security Bancorp. Tennesse are of the order of 360 millions dollars. or in a particular industry), one would expect them to have a greater incentive to diversify their portfolios with non-core assets. By the same token, larger, national banks likely have lending portfolios with returns that more closely follow the aggregate returns in the economy, as they are better-able to diversify their own lending portfolio. From a diversification standpoint, we would thus expect a positive correlation between size and the share of core assets. On the other hand, smaller banks might have better access to information about the profitability of their core investments, and therefore be able to achieve higher returns than larger banks on the specific pool of their core-assets. Thus, from a return standpoint, we would expect a negative correlation between size and the share of core assets. The following section presents a simple model featuring these possible channels.
3 Determinants of The Share of Core Assets
A Simple Conceptual Framework
In order to study the role of risk sharing and efficiency of capital allocation as possible determinants of the connectedness (or lack thereof) between a bank and the real economy, we outline a simple conceptual framework.
The economy is composed of a unit of islands. On each island, there is a unit measure of savers, a unit measure of firms (who needs to borrow), and a unit measure of banks. Banks have only access to local savers, who deposit in the banks deposits equal to 1. The banks also have only access to local borrowers, to whom they can lend (core assets, A c ) with expected return R 1 and variance σ 2 1 . The representative bank allocates its deposits across core loans and non-core assets (A nc ). The non-core assets can be thought of assets whose returns are representative of the aggregate dynamics of the economy. The expected return on non-core assets is R 2 . The variance of the returns of the non-core assets is σ 
where a is the share of core-assets in total assets (one). In our terminology, a is the Share of Core Assets. If there is an interior solution, then it is given by the first order condition:
From the above, we can solve for the optimal level of the share of core assets:
The optimal SCA depends on the returns on core and non-core assets, as well as on their variances and their covariance. In particular, the higher the expected returns on core assets, the higher the optimal measure of connectedness should be. This is due to an efficiency in the capital allocation channel.
As for the relation between the optimal SCA and the covariance between the asset returns, it can be shown that:
While the sign of the derivative is in general ambiguous, the presence of a motive for risk-sharing would require it to be positive. If the correlation between the core-assets returns and the aggregate returns is low, in fact, there is scope for diversification through buying claims on other banks, and the SCA should then be low. If the covariance between the two returns is very high, instead, there is little scope for diversification, and hence the SCA would be correspondingly higher. This would imply a positive partial derivative of the optimal SCA with respect to the covariance of the two returns.
Empirical Strategy
In order to explore empirically the channels introduced in our conceptual framework, we develop here a two-stage empirical analysis in the spirit of Fama and McBeth (1973) . In the first stage, we estimate for each bank the following regression:
where R it is the quarterly return on total credit instruments:
R mt is a proxy for the aggregate returns. We include in R mt the quarterly return on the S&P 500, the yields on the 1-year US Government bond and a house price index.
1
it is i.i.d. normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2 .
In equation (6), β i represents the extent of the correlation between the return of a given bank i and the aggregate return. Therefore, the higher the β i , the lower the incentives for risk sharing among banks. α i represents the idiosyncratic return of the assets of a bank i 11 We used the Federal Reserve of Saint Louis Database to retrieve the following data for the United States: i) the S&P 500 growth (compared to the previous quarter), ii) the interest rate on the government bonds with maturity of 1, 2 and 3 years, and iii) an index of real residential property prices (also in percent change from the previous quarter). Since the sample ends on 2016:4, it contains the whole zero lower bound period (ZLB) from 2009 to 2015, during which the FFR was not able to fall. According to Swanson and Williams (2014) , the effective interest rates during that period are 1 to 3-years Treasury bonds, since economic agents decisions depend on the entire yield curve. We use the 1-year bond as our baseline control variable. We obtained nearly identical results using the 2 or the 3 years bonds yields.
after controlling for the aggregate return, monetary policy, and house prices dynamics. The higher the α i , the higher the incentive for a bank to be connected to the real economy.
In the second stage, we take the αs and βs obtained from Equation (6) , and use them as explanatory variables for the average SCA:
where AV SCA i is the average of the SCA for bank i over the period considered, η i is i.i.d. normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2 η , and we insert a control for the size of the balance sheet (measured as the log of the total assets). Efficiency in the allocation of capital implies λ 1 > 0, while risk sharing implies that λ 2 > 0. As discussed before, the sign of λ 2 is theoretically ambiguous. We check how the results change if we restrict our sample to a set of banks for which equation (5) , then equation 5 predicts a positive correlation between the SCA i and the β i . We therefore consider an hypothetical portfolio including our three measures of aggregate returns (the S&P 500, the 1-year US government bond, and the US house price index) weighting them with equal shares. 12 We then compute the return and variance of such portfolio, and identify those banks for which equation 5 would predict an unambiguous positive sign λ 2 . 
Results
Cross-Sectional Results. Table 2 reports our main results using both αs and βs. In order to minimize the impact of outliers, we use only the 98 inner percentile of the distribution of αs and βs, and we exclude those banks for which we had less than 20 observations in the 12 Since our measure of interest rate is annualized, we divide it by 4, to make it comparable with the other returns, which are computed on a quarterly basis. 13 This prediction is clearly conditional on the specific portfolio we are considering in constructing R 2 and σ 2 2 . In our sample, the average quarterly return on the S&P500 is about 1.9%, the 1-year government bond quarterly interest rate is about 0.5%, and the average quarterly growth of the house price index is 0.7%. The average quarterly return on the portfolio of assets of each bank in our sample is 1.6%, ranging from 0.9% to 4.4%. The variance of the return of the hypothetical portfolio is σ first stage regression. We consider the correlation of our banks return to the S&P 500 (β s ), to the yield on 1-year US Government bonds (β f ), and to a measure of the house price index (β h ).
As we can see from the table, the coefficients on the αs and βs are positive and statistically significant. This is true when considering the entire sample and no other control (column 1), including the size of the banks as a control (column 2), and splitting the sample into small and medium banks (column 3) versus large banks (column 4).
14 In column (5), we restrict the sample to those banks who satisfy the conditions R 1 > R 2 and σ . 15 The coefficients are also in this case all positive and strongly statistically significant, and on average larger than the coefficient found in the overall sample.
The R 2 of the regressions, however, are fairly low (between 10% and 25%), thus indicating that the αs and the βs are able to explain only a fraction of the cross-sectional variation in the SCA. While in our conceptual framework there is not a specific role for size, interestingly we 14 We use the same definitions of small, medium and large banks adopted in Section 2.
find that the coefficient on size in the full sample is small and non statistically significant, after we control for αs and βs. At the same time, the unconditional correlation between the average connection and size is negative, consistent with the descriptive evidence presented in Section 2. We also found both a positive and statistically significant correlation between size and the βs and a (stronger) negative correlation between size and the αs. The fact that not size per se, but αs and βs seems to affect the SCA, might also explain why some small banks have low SCA and some large banks have high SCA, as shown in Section 2. (8), but now considering a period-specific average share of core assets for each bank (AV SCA ip ). We also add period-fixed effects, aimed at capturing possible common trends. Table 3 reports the results obtained using a between estimators.
16
Also in this case, we consider all banks with no controls, we then add a control for size, we dividing the sample into large banks and medium-small banks, and we restricting the sample to those banks for which our prediction on λ 2 is unambiguous. Again, as in the case of the pooled cross section results, we find positive and statistically significant results for both αs and βs. However, the explanatory power of these variables as determinants of the dispersion of our measure of SCA remains limited, between 8% and 19%.
Note that the coefficient on size is economically small in all specifications. This suggests that, after controlling for the αs and the βs, there is no strong relationship between bank size and the SCA. 16 We consider only those banks for which we have at least 6 observations to run the first stage regressions in each period. 3.4 The net share of core assets: netting out pure intermediations activities.
In this Section, we study whether recognizing a special role for a pure intermediation services played by some banks (possibly the largest ones) increase the extent to which risk sharing and efficiency of capital allocation can explain the cross-sectional dispersion of the SCA.
In our very simplified conceptual framework, the banks simply solve a portfolio choice in order to invest their deposits. While this delivers very stark predictions, it neglects the role played by banks as pure intermediators of funds, which could be driven by different logic than risk sharing and efficiency of capital allocation. A way to see how this might play an important role in explaining the dynamics of the balance sheets is by considering the importance of non-core liabilities, defined as the share of liabilities not represented by deposits. While non core liabilities do not exist in our conceptual framework, in reality, they are an important feature of our sample of banks. We present also some econometric evidence in Table 4 . Across banks types and time periods, we find a strong negative correlation between non-core liabilities share and the SCA, even after controlling for size and time fixed effects. These findings led us to explore an alternative definition of the connectedness between banks and the real economy -namely, the Net Share of Core Assets -where in the denomi-nator we subtract the non-core liabilities from the total credit market instruments. We can therefore express the Net Share of Core Assets as follows :
Differently from the SCA, the NSCA nets out pure intermediation activities. If pure intermediation activities do not respond to the logic of risk sharing and efficiency in capital allocation, then we should look at how the αs and βs of the banks in our sample can explain this net measure, as opposed to the one presented in Section 2. Obviously, this measure is not bound between zero and one. 17 It can exceed one if some non-core liabilities serve the purpose of financing core-assets. Hence, we run again specification (8) by using this new measure of connectedness. Table 5 and 6 report the results for the cross sectional analysis and the panel analysis. While the point estimates change, the results are fairly similar to the one obtained for the gross measure of connectedness. The R-squared are found between 5.4% and 19.7%, thus leading to the conclusion that a considering a special role for intermediation services does not increase significantly the explanatory power of risk sharing and efficiency in capital allocation as determinants of the SCA. 
SCA and Profitability
We study in this Section whether a broader definition of profitability can shed more light on the determinants of the cross sectional dispersion in the SCA. This could be possible if banks are not optimizing the mean-variance function we posited in equation (2), but they are concerned with overall profitability, which possibly includes fees from depositors for holding non-core assets on their behalf.
Within our conceptual framework, this would amount to a modification of the banks' objective function (equation 2) in which the return on the non-core asset, R 2 , is replaced
Here, x captures fees associated with holding non-core assets, which are independent from their return (we could define these fees as non-core income).
It is then possible that heterogeneity in x is driving some of the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the SCA. Intuitively, banks with higher x are those with more market power, who are able to collect larger fees for holding non-core assets on behalf of their depositors. We would thus expect that banks in which x is higher would be more profitable, and therefore we would expect a negative relationship between profitability and the SCA.
Motivated by this extension, we explore the correlation between the SCA and profitability.
We use the following econometric specification:
where we measure profitability with the return on equity (ROE it ). Z it are time-varying bank level controls. δ t are time fixed effects, and 3 it is i.i.d. normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2 3 . For consistency with the analysis so far, we concentrate on the results of the between estimators, thus exploiting the cross-sectional variation in our variables of interest. Naturally, in this section we make no claim of causality and we limit ourselves to a correlation analysis.
We run the model expressed in equation (10) . Table 7 reports the results for the total sample. Interestingly, there appears to be a positive correlation between the bank connectedness to the real economy and the ROE, and this relation is stronger for the larger banks. This correlation is conditional on leverage and firm size. The coefficient on size (defined as the log of total assets) is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient on leverage is positive when considering the total sample and the sample of small and medium banks, but it turns negative and significant for the large banks. While the evidence presented in this section is more suggestive than conclusive, our results seem not to support the view that heterogeneity across banks in the ability to collect fees can explain the cross-sectional dispersion in SCA.
A "Structural" Exercise
We present in this section a different way to assess the ability of the risk sharing and efficiency of capital allocation channels in explaining the observed SCA of the U.S. Bank holding companies. By considering the model presented in Section 3.2, we use information on the bank-level quarterly return on total credit instrument (7) as well as information on stocks, bonds and real estate to compute a predicted Optimal Share of Core Assets (OSCA) for each bank. We do so by computing the means and the variances of the quarterly returns on credit market instruments for each bank, which corresponds to R 1 and σ 2 1 in equation (4) . As for R 2 and σ 2 2 , we assume an hypothetical portfolio including (with equal weights) the quarterly returns on: i) the S&P500, ii) a 1-year US government bond and iii) a US house price index. We also consider hypothetical portfolios composed only by each of these three assets separately. 18 We can therefore compute also the covariances between the returns of each bank and these hypothetical portfolios, σ 12 . Finally, for each bank, we compute a gamma-dependent optimal share of core assets (OSCA γ ) by using equation (4) . 19 We then compare the distribution of the OSCA γ to the observed SCA. 20 Table 8 reports the results we obtained for different percentiles of the distributions.
For reasonable values of γ, almost the entire distributions of the predicted optimal shares of core assets is 1, thus implying that, at least in the context of the framework presented in Section 3.2, banks should have lent the entirety of their liabilities to the real sector, as opposed to also holding non-core assets. This exercise is obviously highly demanding, because it assumes that the model holds exactly, and that R 2 can be well proxied by our portfolios. While admittedly these are very strong assumptions, the results presented in this Section point to the fact that the exposure of commercial banks to their portfolio of loans might have been below its optimal level for the period we consider. 18 Note that we have an unbalanced panel of banks. Therefore, the mean and variance of the hypothetical portfolios are also bank-specific, depending on how long is the spell of time of each bank in the sample. 19 We impose OSCA γ = 0 for negative values and OSCA γ = 1 for values exceeding one. 20 For consistency with the empirical results presented before, we only include in the computation of these distributions those banks for which we had at least 20 observations available. Percentile Data γ = 2 γ = 4 γ = 40 γ = 100 γ = 1000 γ = 10000
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Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a measure of the extent to which a financial institution is connected to the real economy: the Share of Core Assets (SCA). We construct the SCA for more than 3,700 U.S. bank holding companies. An asset-weighted average of the SCA declines by 20
percentage points in the period from 1995:1 to 2012:4 (from 76% to 56%) and increases by about 10 percentage points in the period between 2013:1 and 2016:4. We explore the extent to which efficiency in capital allocation and risk-sharing among banks can explain the cross-sectional dispersion of our measure, and we find that the role of these two motives as determinants of the SCA is limited.
While our results focus on the cross-sectional determinants of the SCA, our findings question the efficiency of the aggregate decline in the SCA in recent decades. If the aggregate decline were prompted by a greater need for risk sharing or greater possibilities for doing so, then it would be a welcome trend. Our finding that risk sharing motives play a limited role casts doubt on the view that the decline was efficient.
